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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses pre-crisis stock price synchronicity to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in within-crisis synchronicity. Using a large dataset from 19 emerging markets, 
we show that firms with high pre-crisis synchronicity are affected less by financial crisis 
than firms with low pre-crisis synchronicity. We document an inverse parabolic 
relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity and within-crisis synchronicity. Our results 
show that the relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity and within-crisis 
synchronicity is positive until a turning point is reached. After that value, pre-crisis 
synchronicity has a negative impact on within-crisis synchronicity. We argue that firms 
with high pre-crisis synchronicity are, generally, associated with superior governance 
mechanisms (Chan and Hameed, 2006; Dasgupta et al., 2010). Better governance 
mechanisms lead to lower exposure of these firms to financial crisis (Mitton, 2002). Our 
results are also robust across different sub-samples. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G32 
Keywords: Stock Price Synchronicity; Financial Crisis; Emerging Markets; Corporate 
Governance. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Does stock price synchronicity affect firm’s exposure to financial crisis? Are 
firms with high synchronicity affected more by crisis than firms with low synchronicity 
or vice versa? This paper aims to answer these questions by arguing that stock price 
synchronicity affects firm’s exposure to financial crisis by effecting its information 
environment. Prior literature notes that high synchronicity is associated with better 
governance and information environment. Chan and Hameed (2006), for instance, 
document a positive relationship between analyst following – proxy for information 
environment of a firm – and stock price synchronicity. In another related study, Farooq 
and Ahmed (2014) also report similar findings by documenting a positive relationship 
between stock price synchronicity and governance mechanisms. Dasgupta et al. (2010) 
argue that improvement in governance and information environment leads to more 
accurate forecasts about future firm-specific events by investors. They posit that, in 
efficient markets, stock prices respond only to unexpected events. Therefore, when 
investors make accurate forecasts about future firm-specific events, it is more likely that 
prevailing stock prices have already factored in the occurrence of future events. 
Consequently, when events actually happen, stock prices do not react significantly to 
them. In other words, more informative stock prices today are associated with less firm-
specific variation in stock prices in the future. Lower firm-specific variation in stock 
prices, essentially, leads to higher correlation between stock returns and market returns, 
thereby causing high stock price synchronicity.  
Given the significant relationship between stock price synchronicity and 
information environment of a firm, it is very likely that synchronicity acts as an important 
determinant of a firm’s exposure to financial crisis. Our assertion that stock price 
synchronicity effects firm’s exposure to financial crisis is consistent with prior literature 
that documents lower impact of crisis on firms with better governance and information 
environment. Johnson et al. (2000), for example, note that a better governance 
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environment reduces firm’s exposure to crisis by decreasing expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. Mitton (2002) also argues the same by documenting better performance of 
those firms that have governance and information environment during the crisis periods. 
Prior literature argues that firms with weak governance and information environment are 
ideal candidates for expropriation as they provide the means to controlling shareholders 
to hide their actions by misreporting information (Luez et al., 2003). Stock market 
participants recognize this and penalize these firms by exiting them during the crisis 
periods (Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003). 
Consistent with our arguments, we document a parabolic relationship between 
pre-crisis synchronicity and within-crisis synchronicity in a sample of 19 emerging 
markets. Our results show that the relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity and 
within-crisis synchronicity is positive until a turning point is reached. After that point, 
pre-crisis synchronicity has a negative impact on within-crisis synchronicity. Our results 
indicate that the relative amount of market-specific information increases in the prices of 
firms with low pre-crisis synchronicity, thereby leading to a positive relationship between 
pre-crisis synchronicity and within-crisis synchronicity. This relationship inverts for 
firms with high pre-crisis synchronicity. Our results show that the relative amount of 
market-specific information decreases in the prices of firms with high pre-crisis 
synchronicity, thereby leading to a negative relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity 
and within-crisis synchronicity. This asymmetry in the incorporation of market-specific 
information in prices indicates that firms with low pre-crisis synchronicity are affected 
more by the crisis than firms with high pre-crisis synchronicity. Our results are robust 
across different sub-samples and different estimation procedures. 
Furthermore, we complement the above mentioned findings by documenting the 
relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity and within-crisis stock price performance. 
As expected, we report a parabolic relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity and 
within-crisis performance. Our results show that the impact of pre-crisis synchronicity on 
within-crisis performance is negative until a turning point is reached. After that point, 
pre-crisis synchronicity has a positive impact on within-crisis performance. Our results 
are consistent with prior literature that document superior performance of firms with 
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better governance and information environment during the crisis period (Johnson et al., 
2000; Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). We argue that 
high synchronicity is associated with better governance and information environment. 
Therefore, it is more likely to have a positive relationship between pre-crisis 
synchronicity and within-crisis performance for these firms – firms with high 
synchronicity. The opposite holds for firms with low pre-crisis synchronicity. These 
firms, usually, have weak governance and information environment, thereby increasing 
their exposure to crisis and adversely impacting stock price performance during the crisis 
period. 
Our results have significant implications for investors in emerging markets. Our 
results indicate that investors can obtain value relevant information from stock price 
synchronicity. We argue that stock price synchronicity – a publicly available market-
driven indicator – can help investors in these markets to mitigate some of the information 
asymmetries, especially during the times of crisis. 
The paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 briefly discusses the theoretical 
framework for this study. Chapter 3 discusses the data and Chapter 4 provides an 
assessment of our arguments. Chapter 5 documents robustness checks and Chapter 6 
discusses our results. The paper concludes with Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
Stock price synchronicity measure the extent to which stock prices co-move with 
the market. This paper hypothesizes that firms with high pre-crisis synchronicity should 
be affected less by the crisis than firms with low pre-crisis synchronicity. Our arguments 
take their motivation from two strands of literature. The first strand of literature 
associates better governance and information environment with high synchronicity (Chan 
and Hameed, 2006; Dasgupta et al., 2010), while the second strand of literature 
documents lower exposure of firms to crisis if they are governed properly (Johnson et al., 
2000; Mitton, 2002). Taking both strands of literature together would predict that firms 
with high stock price synchronicity should be affected less by the crisis. 
Prior literature documents that the extent of co-movement between the stock 
returns and the market returns – stock price synchronicity – is an increasing function of 
governance and information environment of a firm (Chan and Hameed, 2006; Dasgupta 
et al., 2010; Claessens and Yafeh, 2011; Farooq and Ahmed, 2014).1 Firms with better 
governance environment exhibit higher synchronicity than firms with poor governance 
environment. Chan and Hameed (2006) and Claessens and Yafeh (2011) document that 
stock price synchronicity increases as the extent of analyst coverage goes up.2 Analyst 
coverage is considered as an important mechanism via which information disclosure and 
dissemination takes place (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Chen and Steiner, 2000). In 
another related study, Barberis et al. (2005) document that inclusion in the S&P 500 
index – an event that improves firm’s information environment – increases stock price 
 
1 We are aware of the fact that there is a stream of literature that argues the opposite. For example, Hutton 
et al. (2009) and Gul et al. (2010) find that synchronicity is negatively related to corporate governance 
mechanisms. Morck et al. (2000) argue that weak governance mechanisms discourage informed arbitrage 
activity based on private information. As a result, stock prices are driven less by firm-specific information 
and more by market-wide news (such as rumors). It, therefore, causes all stocks to react to the same set of 
information, thereby resulting in higher co-movement. 
2 In another related study, Chan and Chan (2014) find a significantly negative relationship between stock 
return synchronicity and seasoned equity offerings when an offering does not have analyst coverage. This 
relation declines for offerings that have analyst coverage. They argue that this relationship declines because 
analyst coverage improves the information environment. 
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synchronicity.3 Kelly (2007) compliments the above findings by documenting that low 
stock price synchronicity is indicative of poor governance and information environment. 
Dasgupta et al. (2010) argue that the positive relationship between synchronicity 
and governance environment of a firm is due to the fact that high quality governance 
mechanisms improve the accuracy of forecasts made by investors. They posit that, in 
efficient markets, stock prices respond only to unexpected events. Therefore, when 
disclosure and governance mechanisms improve, investors are able to accurately predict 
future firm-specific events. As a result, there is higher likelihood that prevailing stock 
prices have already factored in the occurrence of future events. Consequently, when 
events actually happen, stock prices do not react significantly to them. In other words, 
more informative stock prices today are associated with less firm-specific variation in 
stock prices in future. Lower firm-specific variation in stock prices, essentially, leads to 
higher correlation between stock returns and market returns, thereby causing high stock 
price synchronicity.  
A secondary reasoning that follows Dasgupta et al. (2010) is that their arguments 
should be more relevant for investors that have required skills and sophistication to form 
accurate forecasts as information environment of a firm improves. Investors without such 
skills may not be able to benefit as much from the improvements in information 
environment. We argue that individual investors lack the skills and abilities to make the 
best use of available information. It is, usually, the institutional investors who have 
enough skills and sophistication to form accurate forecasts as the information 
environment of a firm improves. Therefore, it is very likely that firms with high 
synchronicity have high institutional ownership. Kelly (2007) also comes to the same 
conclusion and documents that firms with high synchronicity have dominant institutional 
holdings. One implication of attracting institutional investors is that, in most cases, these 
investors take the role of marginal investors.4 Given that institutional investors are 
 
3 We argue that inclusion in the S&P 500 index improves governance and information environment of a 
firm via increased institutional ownership. Pruitt and Wei (1989) show that inclusion in the S&P 500 index 
is associated with increased institutional ownership and deletion is accompanied by decrease in institutional 
ownership. Chung and Zhang (2011) argue that institutional investors invest in firms with better 
governance mechanisms. Furthermore, inclusion in the S&P 500 index should also improve information 
environment of a firm via increased visibility of a firm. 
4 Marginal investors are investors who set the price of a stock. 
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probably the most diversified investors in the market, it is intuitive to argue that they 
experience relatively lower firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk.5 Therefore, the only risk 
priced by them is the market risk. As a result, most of the variation in stock returns will 
be explained by the variation in market returns, thereby causing high synchronicity 
between stock returns and market returns in firms where institutional holding is 
dominant. 
We argue that both of the above factors (superior governance environment and 
institutions as marginal investors) associated with firms exhibiting high synchronicity 
have significant impact on how much exposed a firm will be to the crisis. We hypothesize 
that firms that have high synchronicity prior to crisis should be effected less by crisis 
relative to firms that have low synchronicity prior to crisis. Our hypothesis depends on 
the following arguments: 
• Johnson et al. (2000) document that incentives to expropriate minority shareholders 
increase during the crisis period – period when stock prices experience sustained 
decline. They argue that a crisis can lead to greater expropriation because managers 
are led to expropriate more as the expected return on investment falls. Furthermore, 
declining fortunes in the stock market can force investors to recognize weaknesses in 
corporate governance mechanisms. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that investors 
usually ignore corporate governance mechanisms during the tranquil periods, but take 
notice of them as the crisis erupts and quickly pull out their capital. Furthermore, in 
the presence of weak governance mechanisms, it becomes hard to govern managerial 
discretion. Managers of these firms have more discretionary power over the 
disclosure of information. As a result, they do not always disclose true information 
about their firms (Leuz et al., 2003). Poor disclosure introduces increased information 
asymmetries for investors. Investors, generally, respond to this increased uncertainty 
by overreacting to the crisis. Mitton (2002) shows that firms with poor corporate 
governance mechanisms react more severely to financial crisis than firms with better 
governance mechanisms. Given that weak governance environment is associated with 
 
5 Institutional investors, generally, have huge sums of money which they can invest in large number of 
stocks (Aggarwal et al., 2005; McCahery et al., 2011). Therefore, institutional investors possess portfolios 
that are relatively more diversified than other investors (Schutte and Fu, 2009). 
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firms exhibiting low synchronicity, we expect that these firms should have higher 
exposure to crisis relative to firms with high synchronicity. 
• An important implication of the above result is that investors with long investment 
horizon are less likely to exit a stock during the downturns. De Long et al. (1990) 
document that when stock prices fall, investors with short investment horizons are 
inclined or forced to sell to a larger extent than investors with longer investment 
horizons. Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Morris and Shin (2004) compliment the 
findings of De Long et al. (1990) by showing that a run on financial markets occurs 
because investors with short investment horizon sell in anticipation that other market 
participants will also sell. Since a short investment horizon implies that the investor 
will have to sell in immediate future, not selling right away may involve selling 
behind the rest of the market at even lower prices. Hence, for an investor with short 
investment horizon, the optimal strategy is to beat the rest of the market by selling 
immediately to avoid having to sell after a market run. However, this is not the case 
for investors with long investment horizon. These investors tend not to exit in haste 
during the downturns. Given that investors with long investment horizon do not react 
to downturns as much as other investors, it is very likely that stocks that had high 
synchronicity prior to the downturn should have low synchronicity during the 
downturn.6  
 
6 Investors having long horizon are, usually, institutional investors. These investors are well-diversified and 
perceive very little idiosyncratic risk. Consequently, market-specific risk explains much of the variation in 
returns of these socks, thereby causing high synchronicity. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
DATA 
This paper documents the effect of recent financial crisis on firms with high stock 
price synchronicity and firms with low stock price synchronicity. We define 2008 as the 
year of crisis. Our timeline of financial crisis is motivated by the Federal Reserve Board 
of St. Louis (2009) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2009). These studies 
characterize the initial part of 2008 as a period of “initial financial turmoil” and the later 
part of 2008 as a period of “sharp financial market deterioration”. Visual inspection of 
the data also shows that stock markets in all countries included in our analysis 
experienced sustained decline during 2008. For the purpose of this study, our sample 
consists of firms listed in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United 
Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Greece, Russia and Turkey. The following sub-sections will 
explain data in greater details. 
 
3.1 Stock price synchronicity 
 
Our measure of stock price synchronicity uses the following regression equation 
with returns of stock ‘i’ during week ‘t’ (Ri,t) as a dependent variable and returns of the 
corresponding market index ‘m’ for the same week (Rm,t) as an independent variable. 
Following prior literature, we estimate the following regression only for those firms for 
which we have at least 40 weekly observations of returns in a given year (Xing and 
Anderson, 2011; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Nguyen and Truong, 2013). The date required 
to estimate Equation (1) is obtained from the Datastream. 
( ) ti,tm,ti, εRβαR ++=                           
(1) 
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R-square obtained from the estimation of Equation (1) is used as follows to 
compute stock price synchronicity (SYNCH).7 A high value of SYNCH
 
indicates high 
co-movement with the market and vice versa.  






−
=
R²1
R²
SYNCH                           
(2) 
Table 1 reports the average values of stock price synchronicity for our sample 
during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. The results indicate that, in all countries, stock 
price synchronicity increased during the crisis period. This result is intuitive because all 
firms tend to decline together (move together) during the crisis period, thereby increasing 
synchronicity. Another interesting observation from Table 1 is low synchronicity for our 
sample firms across most of the countries. Table 1 shows that, in most of the countries, 
the value of synchronicity is below 1. It indicates that R-square obtained from estimation 
of Equation (1) is, on average, less than 50%. Low values of stock price synchronicity are 
in contrast with the arguments of Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) who 
suggest high synchronicity in emerging markets. We argue that the main reason behind 
low synchronicity is the under diversification of marginal investors in these markets. 
Under diversification exposes marginal investors to excessive idiosyncratic risk, thereby 
allowing them to take into account firm-specific risks while pricing stocks. It will, 
therefore, reduce the relative amount of market-wide information in stock returns and 
result in low values of synchronicity.  
 
  
 
7 Prior literature uses log of the value obtained from Equation (2) as a measure of synchronicity (Jin and 
Myers, 2006; Farooq and Ahmed, 2014). This log transformation is performed because synchronicity is 
used as a dependent variable in the analysis. Log transformation converts a bounded variable into a 
continuous variable. We, however, are interested in using synchronicity as an independent variable. 
Therefore, we need not to perform the log transformation. 
10 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for stock price synchronicity 
Following table documents the descriptive statistics for stock price synchronicity. Our sample consists of 
firms listed in Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and 
Vietnam. The pre-crisis period is 2007 and the crisis period is 2008.  
 
Country Pre-crisis Period Crisis Period Total Firms 
Argentina 0.3694 0.9125 41 
Brazil 0.3849 0.6866 93 
China 0.5483 1.2308 1265 
Egypt 0.1696 0.6041 90 
Greece 0.2106 0.5439 194 
India 0.1066 0.4796 2222 
Indonesia 0.3004 0.8600 127 
Jordan 0.1687 0.4909 98 
Malaysia 0.2701 0.4386 499 
Mexico 0.4581 0.5896 51 
Philippines 0.4798 0.8712 84 
Russia 0.4346 0.6455 59 
Taiwan 0.4592 0.6491 693 
Thailand 0.3377 0.6333 308 
Turkey 0.4660 0.8817 246 
Saudi Arabia 0.8471 1.2892 81 
South Korea 0.1521 0.7701 1098 
United Arab Emirates 0.5964 1.4520 49 
Vietnam 0.2199 1.2047 31 
 
3.2 Control variables 
 
This paper uses a number of firm-specific characteristics as control variables. 
These variables are:  
• SIZE: We define SIZE as the log of firm’s market capitalization. The data for market 
capitalization is obtained from the Worldscope. Given that market indices are, 
usually, value-weighted indices, large firms dominate the index. Therefore, it is 
expected that large firms should have higher synchronicity (Chan and Hameed, 
2006). 
• LEVERAGE: This paper defines LEVERAGE as the total debt to total asset ratio. 
The data for total debt to total asset ratio is obtained from the Worldscope. High 
leverage exposes firms to greater risk and therefore increases information 
asymmetries. Press and Weintrop (1990) and Sweeney (1994) document information 
misreporting by firms with high leverage. Given that leverage is associated with 
information asymmetries, we expect significant impact of leverage on synchronicity. 
11 
 
Dasgupta et al. (2010) document a negative relationship between leverage and 
synchronicity. 
• EPS: This paper defines EPS as earnings per share. The data for earnings per share is 
obtained from the Worldscope. High earnings per share are associated with increased 
interest of stock market participants. Therefore, it should also affect synchronicity. 
Dasgupta et al. (2010) document positive impact of profitability on synchronicity. 
• GROWTH: We define GROWTH as the growth in total assets. The data for growth 
in total assets is obtained from the Worldscope. We consider growth as a proxy for 
investor interest in a firm. High investor interest improves information environment 
and, therefore should affect synchronicity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to test whether firms exhibiting low (high) synchronicity during the pre-
crisis period are more (less) sensitive to the crisis or not, we estimate the following 
regression equations with LOG(SYNCHCrisis) as a dependent variable and SYNCHPre-crisis 
and SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis as independent variables. As indicated above, we also 
include SIZE, LEVERAGE, GROWTH, and EPS as control variables. For the purpose of 
completeness, we also include industry dummies (IDUM) and country dummies (CDUM) 
in our analysis. Our basic regression equations are defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Crisis
Ctry Ind
IndCtry
crisis-Precrisis-Pre2crisis-Pre1Crisis
εIDUMβCDUMβ
SYNCH*SYNCHβSYNCHβαSYNCHLOG
+++
++=
           
(3) 
And 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Crisis
Ctry Ind
IndCtry
Crisis6Crisis5Crisis4Crisis3
crisis-Precrisis-Pre2crisis-Pre1Crisis
εIDUMβCDUMβ
GROWTHβEPSβLEVERAGEβSIZEβ
SYNCH*SYNCHβSYNCHβαSYNCHLOG
+++
++++
++=
 
         
(4) 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 2. Our results show that the 
relationship between synchronicity during the pre-crisis period and synchronicity during 
the crisis period is parabolic. Our results from both equations show a significantly 
positive coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis and a significantly negative coefficient of 
SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis. Our results indicate that the relationship between 
synchronicity during the pre-crisis period and synchronicity during the crisis period is 
positive until a turning point is reached. After that value, synchronicity during the pre-
crisis period has a negative impact on synchronicity during the crisis period. We argue 
that firms with low synchronicity have weak governance mechanisms. Consequently, 
these firms are affected more by the crisis, thereby increasing their co-movement with the 
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market during the crisis period. Furthermore, we also argue that it is possible that firms 
with low synchronicity have less sophisticated (or naïve) marginal investors. These 
investors, usually, have short-term investment horizons. They, therefore, tend to over-
react to any negative shocks in the financial markets. Consequently, when a crisis erupts, 
these investors tend to sell their holding, thereby increasing the exposure of firms to the 
crisis and increasing synchronicity during the crisis period. It, therefore, results in a 
significantly positive coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis. On the other hand, firms with high 
synchronicity have better governance. As a result, their co-movement with the market 
declines during the crisis period. It, therefore, results in a significantly negative 
coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis. 
 
Table 2: Stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to the financial crisis 
Following table uses Equation (3) and Equation (4) to document the relationship between stock price 
synchronicity and sensitivity to financial crisis. Our sample consists of firms listed in Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. The crisis period is 2008. The 
coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficients with 5% by **, and coefficients with 
10% by *. 
 
 Equation (3) Equation (4) 
SYNCH 2.5206*** 2.2021*** 1.3372*** 1.0971*** 
SYNCH*SYNCH -0.4405*** -0.3639*** -0.1918*** -0.1727*** 
     
SIZE   0.1455*** 0.2488*** 
LEVERAGE   0.0020** 0.0017** 
EPS   -0.0001 -0.0003 
GROWTH   -0.0017*** -0.0027*** 
     
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes No Yes 
     
No. of Observations 7329 7329 4131 4131 
F-value 1046.35 101.75 212.99 53.78 
Adjusted R-square 0.181 0.256 0.215 0.305 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS 
5.1 Stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to financial crisis in different sub-samples 
 
There may be concerns that our results are confined to certain stocks. In order to 
overcome this concern, we divided our sample into the following sub-groups: (1) Small 
firms vs. large firms, and (2) Less profitable firms vs. more profitable firms. We re-
estimate Equation (4) for all sub-groups. The results of our analysis are reported in Table 
3. Our results confirm our previous finding of parabolic relationship between 
synchronicity during the pre-crisis period and synchronicity during the crisis period. We 
report significantly positive coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis and a significantly negative 
coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis for all sub-groups. 
 
Table 3: Stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to the financial crisis in different sub-samples 
Following table uses Equation (4) to document the relationship between stock price synchronicity and 
sensitivity to the financial crisis in different sub-samples. Our sample consists of firms listed in Argentina, 
Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. The crisis period is 
2008. The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficients with 5% by **, and 
coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
 Small Firms Large Firms Less Profitable 
Firms 
More Profitable 
Firms 
SYNCH 2.0004*** 1.1224*** 0.8740*** 1.4931*** 
SYNCH*SYNCH -0.9946*** -0.1533*** -0.1521*** -0.2328*** 
     
SIZE 0.3477*** 0.1394*** 0.2848*** 0.1931*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0006 0.0020** 0.0011 0.0032*** 
EPS 0.0015 -0.0001 0.0027 -0.0005 
GROWTH -0.0028*** -0.0026*** -0.0038*** -0.0023*** 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
No. of Observations 1975 2156 2135 1996 
F-value 15.34 26.69 35.48 24.40 
Adjusted R-square 0.252 0.283 0.359 0.278 
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5.2 Stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to financial crisis (quantile regression 
analysis) 
 
Our analysis implies that no matter what point on the conditional distribution is 
analyzed, the estimates of the relationship between synchronicity during the pre-crisis 
period and synchronicity during the crisis period are the same. To test the empirical 
validity of this restrictive assumption and to document the relationship at different points 
of conditional distribution of synchronicity during the crisis period, a quantile regression 
is applied at five quantiles (namely 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 0.70, and 0.90). The results of our 
analysis are reported in Table 4. As was documented before, we report significantly 
positive coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis and a significantly negative coefficient of 
SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis for points of conditional distribution. 
 
Table 4: Stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to the financial crisis (quantile regression) 
Following table uses Equation (4) and quantile regression analysis to document the relationship between 
stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to the financial crisis. Our sample consists of firms listed in 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. The crisis 
period is 2008. The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficients with 5% by **, and 
coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 
SYNCH 2.0447*** 1.0791*** 0.9006*** 0.6620*** 0.5619*** 
SYNCH*SYNCH -0.5907*** -0.1724*** -0.1451*** -0.0889*** -0.0655*** 
      
SIZE 0.2988*** 0.2219*** 0.1870*** 0.1711*** 0.1429*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0068*** 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 
EPS -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
GROWTH -0.0040*** -0.0029*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** -0.0014*** 
      
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No. of Observations 4131 4131 4131 4131 4131 
Pseudo R-square 0.231 0.193 0.177 0.173 0.188 
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5.3 Corporate governance mechanisms and the relationship between stock price 
synchronicity and sensitivity to financial crisis 
 
Prior literature argues that firms with high synchronicity have better governance 
and information environment. Farooq and Ahmed (2014), for example, document a 
positive relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and stock price 
synchronicity. If firms with high synchronicity are associated with better governance 
mechanisms, it is possible that these firms should also be less affected by the crisis 
(Mitton, 2002). If this is true, results obtained above may be due to the governance and 
information environment of firms rather than synchronicity. In order to overcome these 
concerns, we control for the following variables. These variables can be used as proxies 
for various aspects of governance and information environment. 
• ANALYST: Prior literature considers analyst coverage (ANALYST) as a mechanism 
via which information disclosure and dissemination takes place (Farooq and Satt, 
2014). The greater the number of analysts covering a firm, the better is its information 
environment and the lower is its information asymmetry. This paper defines 
ANALYST as the maximum number of analysts issuing recommendations in a given 
year. 
• OWNERSHIP: Prior literature considers ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP) 
as an important governance variable (Farooq and Kacemi, 2011). Concentration of 
ownership in the hands of few allows managers and controlling shareholders to evade 
effective disclosure of information (Leuz et al., 2003). Poor information disclosure 
exacerbates information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders and result in 
agency problems. It is also been argued that high ownership concentration creates an 
entrenchment problem that allows self-dealings by controlling shareholders to go 
unchallenged by boards of directors. This paper defines OWNERSHIP as the 
percentage of shares held by the insiders. 
The modified regressions look like the following: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Crisis
Ctry Ind
IndCtry
Crisis9Crisis8Crisis7Crisis6
Crisiscrisis-Precrisis-Pre5
Crisiscrisis-Pre4Crisis3
crisis-Precrisis-Pre2crisis-Pre1Crisis
εIDUMβCDUMβ
GROWTHβEPSβLEVERAGEβSIZEβ
GOV*SYNCH*SYNCHβ
GOV*SYNCHβGOVβ
SYNCH*SYNCHβSYNCHβαSYNCHLOG
+++
++++
+
++
++=
 
 
        (5) 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 5. Our results show that 
coefficient estimates of SYNCHPre-crisis and SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis retain their 
significance and direction even after controlling for governance mechanisms. As was 
shown above, our results indicate parabolic relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity 
and within crisis synchronicity. Furthermore, we also show that the extent of analyst 
coverage and ownership concentration have significant impact on synchronicity. Our 
results show that analyst coverage increases stock price synchronicity, while ownership 
concentration decreases stock price synchronicity. These results are consistent with Chan 
and Hameed (2006) and Boubaker et al. (2014) who document similar findings as ours. 
Interestingly, our results also show that analyst coverage reduces within-crisis 
synchronicity – firm’s exposure to crisis – for firms with low pre-crisis low 
synchronicity. We report significantly negative coefficient of SYNCH*GOV for analyst 
coverage. We argue that firms with low pre-crisis low synchronicity have poor 
information environment. Therefore, any mechanism – such as high analyst coverage – 
that can help reduce information asymmetries is valuable for stock market participants. 
We argue that stock market participants respond to higher analyst coverage by reducing 
firm’s exposure to crisis. Similarly, we also show that ownership concentration reduces 
within-crisis synchronicity for firms with high pre-crisis synchronicity. We argue that 
controlling shareholders have less incentive to adopt poor disclosure policies when stock 
prices are more informative. Therefore, for firms with high pre-crisis synchronicity, 
ownership concentration reduces within-crisis synchronicity. 
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Table 5: Effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between stock price 
synchronicity and sensitivity to the financial crisis  
Following table uses Equation (5) to document the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
relationship between stock price synchronicity and sensitivity to the financial crisis. Our sample consists of 
firms listed in Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and 
Vietnam. The crisis period is 2008. The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficients 
with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
 Analyst Coverage Ownership Concentration 
SYNCH 1.4533*** 0.8300*** 
SYNCH*SYNCH -0.2010*** -0.0847** 
   
GOV 0.0157** -0.0045*** 
   
SYNCH*GOV -0.0297*** 0.0068** 
SYNCH*SYNCH*GOV 0.0054 -0.0038*** 
   
SIZE 0.1489*** 0.2519*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0020** 0.0017* 
EPS -0.0002 0.0005 
GROWTH -0.0017*** -0.0028*** 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 4131 3586 
F-value 81.39 43.77 
Adjusted R-square 0.227 0.309 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
If the level of synchronicity affects the sensitivity to crisis, it should also affect 
firm performance during the crisis period. In order to test this conjecture, we estimate the 
following regression with firm performance during the crisis period (PER) as a dependent 
variable. We define PER by two variables: (1) Excess return and (2) Market value to 
book value ratio. Excess return is defined as the difference between gross stock returns 
and market returns. Our regression equation takes the following form: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Crisis
Ctry Ind
IndCtry
crisis-Precrisis-Pre2crisis-Pre1Crisis
εIDUMβCDUMβ
SYNCH*SYNCHβSYNCHβαPER
+++
++=
                   
(6) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Crisis
Ctry Ind
IndCtry
Crisis6Crisis5Crisis4Crisis3
crisis-Precrisis-Pre2crisis-Pre1Crisis
εIDUMβCDUMβ
GROWTHβEPSβLEVERAGEβSIZEβ
SYNCH*SYNCHβSYNCHβαPER
+++
++++
++=
 
                
(7) 
And 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Crisis
Ctry Ind
IndCtry
Crisis9Crisis8Crisis7Crisis6
Crisis5Crisis4Crisis3
crisis-Precrisis-Pre2crisis-Pre1Crisis
εIDUMβCDUMβ
GROWTHβEPSβLEVERAGEβSIZEβ
OWNERSHIPβANALYSTβPoRβ
SYNCH*SYNCHβSYNCHβαPER
+++
++++
+++
++=
 
            
(8) 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 6. As expected, our results from 
all equations show a significantly negative coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis and a 
significantly positive coefficient of SYNCHPre-crisis*SYNCHPre-crisis. The result 
complements our earlier findings because our results in Table 6 also indicate that firms 
with low synchronicity are more exposed to crisis than firms with high synchronicity. We 
show a negative relationship between pre-crisis synchronicity and within-crisis 
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performance for firms with low synchronicity and positive relationship between pre-crisis 
synchronicity and within-crisis performance for firms with high synchronicity. 
 
Table 6: Stock price synchronicity and firm performance during the financial crisis  
Following table uses Equation (8) and Equation (9) to document the relationship between stock price 
synchronicity and firm performance during the financial crisis. Our sample consists of firms listed in 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. The crisis 
period is 2008. The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficients with 5% by **, and 
coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
 Excess Returns Market Value to Book Value Ratio 
 Equation 
(6) 
Equation 
(7) 
Equation 
(8) 
Equation 
(6) 
Equation 
(7) 
Equation 
(8) 
SYNCH -0.1037*** -0.0979*** -0.0972*** -0.4140*** -1.1763*** -1.4131*** 
SYNCH*SYNCH 0.0182*** 0.0170*** 0.0183*** 0.0533 0.1409*** 0.1565*** 
       
PoR   0.0012***   0.0002 
ANALYST   0.0012   0.0444** 
OWNERSHIP   0.0006***   0.0011 
       
SIZE  0.0090*** 0.0033  0.4405*** 0.4004*** 
LEVERAGE  -0.0011*** -0.0009***  0.0043 0.0057 
EPS  0.0001* 0.0004**  -0.0019 -0.0029 
GROWTH  0.0011*** 0.0009***  0.0031*** 0.0035*** 
       
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
No. of 
Observations 
7329 4131 2801 6663 4015 2723 
F-value 35.28 32.62 22.19 46.41 29.02 19.17 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.098 0.226 0.229 0.137 0.141 0.133 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCULSION 
This paper uses data from emerging markets to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in stock price synchronicity during the recent financial crisis. Our results show 
that firms with high stock price synchronicity during the pre-crisis period have less 
exposure to financial crisis than firms with low synchronicity during the pre-crisis period. 
We document parabolic relationship between stock price synchronicity during the pre-
crisis period and stock price synchronicity during the crisis period. Consistent with prior 
literature, we argue that firms with high stock price synchronicity during the pre-crisis 
period are, generally, associated with superior governance mechanisms (Chan and 
Hameed, 2006; Dasgupta et al., 2010). Better governance mechanisms lead to lower 
exposure of these firms to financial crisis (Mitton, 2002). Our results are robust across 
different sub-samples. 
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